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Abstract
We are concerned with the dangers arising from excessive international
debt overhang, primarily to financial stability in the debtor country. Assum-
ing that debt forgiveness is not possible, a subject which we modelled earlier
relating to the Greek debt crisis, (Goodhart et al. (2018)), we show how an
independent monetary policy can be used to smooth consumption for both
borrowers and lenders. A counter-cyclical monetary policy can contract liq-
uidity when debt growth is high and expand liquidity when default rates are
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1 Introduction
This paper considers a counterfactual environment where an independent Czech
monetary policy is used to stabilise credit conditions in the Czech Republic.
Such policies are shown to perform a similar role to debt-forgiveness policies
highlighted in Goodhart et al. (2016), and have similar results: both lender
and borrower consumption paths are stabilised over the business cycle.
The possibility of monetary policy being used as, additionally, a tool for
financial stability has been debated since the financial crisis of 2007. The use
of unconventional policies and large expansions of central bank balance sheets
post-crisis could potentially have been avoided if the credit and financial booms
could have been managed. Clearly such a role for monetary policy implies a
trade-off for inflation-output stabilisation objectives.1 We abstract from these,
but also limit ourselves by not allowing inflation to play a redistributive role,
either through direct wealth effects, or through affecting the real value of debt.
In fact, we focus only on the liquidity aspect of monetary policy and the channel
through which it affects real trade.
In this paper we examine the interaction between a set of debtors, whom we
characterize as Czechs, and a set of creditors, whom we term Europeans. We
outline the circumstances that may make the Czech debtors choose to renege,
to default, on their unsecured debt, dependent on the various costs which
such default entails. The costs and benefits of default are quite complex,
and we have modelled these carefully. In our model, creditors (Europeans)
can be more or less tough, (forgiving being the inverse of tough), in imposing
1For an extensive discussion on these issues see Borio (2014), Monetary Policy and Fi-
nancial Stability (2015), Adrian and Liang (2016), Smets (2014), Woodford (2012) among
others.
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penalties on the defaulting Czechs. We model this as a ‘recovery’ rate, whereby
the European creditors can grab, and use for themselves (i.e. recover), a larger
share (a higher recovery rate), of the underlying defaulted assets.
Most of the debate on the costs/benefits of default and renegotiation have
primarily focussed on the effects and trade-offs for the debtors’, while the
effects on creditors have largely been ignored, or assumed to be negative 2.
The language of the discussion has been couched within the framework of a
“zero-sum” game, and in other words the assumption that any debt relief to
debtors must entail a (net present value) transfer of resources from creditors.
We show that, if policies of debt renegotiation or forgiveness such as those
discussed in Goodhart et al. (2016) are not available, then an independent
monetary policy that varies appropriately over the business cycle can achieve
similar results. Specifically, the volatility of both debtors and creditors con-
sumption will fall.
From the early 1990s, the transition of the Czech economy from a planned
to a market one resulted in significant foreign direct investment. The largest
part of this investment was contributed to the banking and financial sectors,
with up to 97% of banking assets being owned by foreign investors.3 At the
same time, the Czech National Bank statistics indicate that one fourth of total
liabilities are owed to non-residents, which accounts nearly 95% of GDP4, a
number increasing rapidly in recent years. While the Czech Republic ran a
positive net export of 4.6% of GDP for 2006-2015, it ran a negative overall cur-
2See Zettelmeyer et al. (2013), Ardagna and Caselli (2014) and Broner et al. (2014) for
analysis of Greek restructuring episodes since 2010.
3See Weill (2003).
4Average number for 2013-2017.
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rent account of -1.5% of GDP for the same period.5 These large gross external
liabilities indicate the fragility of the Czech economy, and its susceptibility to
changes in the external funding environment even if Czech banks satisfy the
capital requirement buffer of 10.5% with excess6, a small negative shock could
trigger a huge economic downturn with currency crisis and default crisis, which
are positively correlated.
In our model we assume that the Czech capital stock, in addition to internal
financing, is externally financed by inflation-indexed unsecured debt. Failure
to honour the debt would invoke bankruptcy proceedings in which case the
lender has a limited claim on the existing wealth of the borrower and cannot
invoke bankruptcy proceedings. Thus a key feature of the paper is that the
possibility of default in equilibrium exists on unsecured debt. We assume that
Czech households can only issue inflation-indexed non-state-contingent bonds.
Debtors may choose to renege on some of their debt obligations, but then suffer
a renegotiation cost. In order to be able to borrow again, they must pay this
cost and, in this sense, the decision to default is strategic. In our model, the
possibility of default is micro-founded on the moral hazard relationship prob-
lem between debtors and creditors. If debtors default, they incur a welfare
cost in renegotiations proportional to the scale of default. This cost effectively
creates a borrowing constraint and stems from Shubik and Wilson. (1977) and
Dubey et al. (2005) and applied in Tsomocos (2003), Goodhart et al. (2005)
and Goodhart et al. (2006). In the RBC literature, our model shares similar
features to De Walque et al. (2010). Our closest methodological precursors
are Peiris and Tsomocos (2015) (which studies a two period large open in-
5Eurostat data.
6Basel III. Minimum buffer for Total Capital (8%) plus Conservation buffer (2.5%).
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ternational economy with incomplete markets and default); Goodhart et al.
(2013), which explores the effect of international capital flow taxation on de-
fault and welfare in a deterministic two period large open economy; and Walsh
(2015a) and Walsh (2015b), which consider default in a small open dynamic
incomplete markets economy. In these latter two papers, the marginal cost of
default depends on the level of wealth, so the propensity to default depends
on business cycle fluctuations. We follow this notion here by introducing a
macrovariable that governs the marginal cost of renegotiating debt (default),
termed ‘credit conditions’. We argue that credit-conditions can be adequately
captured by an appropriate state variable in order to describe the relation-
ship between loan delinquencies and capital stock. We hasten to add that
the debtor country takes the credit-conditions variable as given since creditors
are capable of imposing institutional arrangements that are non-negotiable.7
Our economy displays the minimum features necessary to highlight the role
that an aggregate credit-conditions variable plays in amplifying and propagat-
ing financial shocks. There is a representative Czech household which owns
and operates a means of production and a large external lender, described as
European Union households. Default generates an effective return differential
between borrowers and lenders. Lenders receive repayment net of default. On
the other hand, borrowers repay their obligations net of default but also in-
cur the private cost of defaulting, the sum of which amounts to the gross of
default interest rate. As borrowers require financing for investment in capital,
the higher cost of debt caused by default results in a higher required rate of
return on capital and hence a lower long-run capital stock. European Union
7Indeed, that was exactly the misconception that contributed to the unsatisfactory at-
tempt to renegotiate the terms of the agreement during the summer of 2015.
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creditors in our model can seize a proportion of defaulted debt. Thus, borrow-
ers effectively incur two additive costs of defaulting: the non-pecuniary cost of
renegotiation and a pecuniary punishment via having wealth confiscated. The
pecuniary punishment for default is similar to the cost incurred by borrowers
who obtain debt against durable collateral8. The difference in our specification
is two-fold. Firstly, there is a general claim on wealth rather than on a specific
asset. Secondly, that the seizure of wealth does not occur due to the change
in some relative price, as in the literature on collateral, but because of the
inability of the borrower to honour a debt obligation.
2 The Model
The economy consists of 2 countries, Czech Republic (the borrower) and the
European Union (the lender), each inhabited by a continuum of identical in-
finitely lived agents. European households receive income from a portfolio of
Czech and non-Czech assets. We simplify the nature of income generated from
non-Czech assets, so European household decisions we model should be viewed
as the marginal decisions affected by interactions with Czech financial assets,
with income and expenditure decisions from non-Czech financial and economic
interactions taken as given. As we assume a single homogenous good in the
world economy, all trade balance effects are subsumed in the capital account.
There is one fundamental source of uncertainty in our economy: shocks to
Czech Total Factor Productivity (A). Fluctuations in TFP also determine
various policy rules we consider for the recovery rate on outstanding debt:
8See Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) for an excellent overview of this literature where
default occurs in equilibrium
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the recovery rate (κ). We study the impact of TFP shocks only, because we
believe that after the initial crisis episode in 2009, the economy continued to
maintain the same fundamental characteristics. In particular, we believe the
economy was subject to regular TFP shocks. Certainly it experienced many
other shocks including to the political environment (domestic and foreign, such
as the refugee crisis) and the global economic environment. We believe that
studying them and their implications for creditor debt policies would be addi-
tional to studying the more fundamental TFP shocks the country experienced.
Finally, any shocks that reduce the capital stock and/or national income di-
rectly that do not depend on the business cycle can be summarised within the
TFP shock we model.
2.1 The European Union
European households are assumed to have an outside source of income which
does not depend on the loan portfolio extended to Czech Republic, and reflects
their total net foreign assets (NFA). In addition, they purchase one-period
inflation-indexed unsecured bonds issued by Czechs. Unsecured bonds are
risky and there is an expected repayment rate associated with each bond.
Preferences include a CRRA utility function for consumption.
max
c,bs,bu
∞∑
s=0
βsEt
{[
cEUt+s
]1−σ − 1
1− σ
}
, (1)
Each period European Union households earn income, from their (ex Czech
Republic) net foreign assets and net Czech assets, and allocate it between
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consumption (cEUt ) and new assets. Specifically9,
cEUt + b
EU
u,t +
adjEUu
2
(bEUu,t − b
EU
u )
2 +NFAEUt
= (Rut−1)(1− defCZt )bEUu,t−1 + κt(Rut−1)(defCZt )bEUu,t−1
+NFAEUt−1(R
NFA
t ). (2)
The ex-Czech Net Foreign Asset position of European households is calibrated
and assumed to evolve exogenously (a constant). The return on the NFA
portfolio is also assumed to be exogenous and constant.10 Recall that κ is
the recovery rate on unsecured debt defaulted upon. It is exogenous to the
model, but is interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation between creditors
and debtors.
The maximisation programme yields
ψEUt =
[
cEUt
]−σ (3)
ψEUt
{
1 + adjEUu (b
EU
u,t − b
EU
u )
}
= βEUEt
{
REPt+1R
u
t ψ
EU
t+1
}
(4)
where ψEUt is the marginal utility of consumption of European households and
REPt+1 = 1 − (1 − κt+1)(defCZt+1) is the net delivery rate including the an-
9This quadratic adjustment term (adjEUs ) is used to guarantee that secured debt holdings
converge back to steady state values.
10One may think of this as the fruit of a non-stochastic Lucas tree. It is taken as a constant
in order to isolate the marginal effect on European consumption of their Czech portfolio,
independent of unrelated fluctuations in total European income. More importantly, we do
not allow European lenders to have alternative opportunities to invest savings. However,
the supply of loans is not elastic as Europeans still have a legitimate consumption-savings
decision, but the trade-off itself is limited to investments in Czech Republic. Nevertheless,
alternative investment opportunities would provide a richer framework to study the supply
of loans to Czech Republic.
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nounced rate of default and the recovery rate. Note that European households
care about the rate of return net-of-default and recovery. In the steady state,
the net-of-default rate of return on loans is simply the rate of time preference.
Note that in the deterministic steady state 1
βGER
= REP R
u.
2.2 Czech Republic
The Czech economy is represented by Czech households who wholly own firms
in a competitive industry that identically has access to a production technology
which uses capital (capCZt ) and labour (labCZt ) as inputs. The production
function is Cobb-Douglas and has constant returns to scale, with an income
share of a and 1− a to capital and labour respectively
F (capCZt−1, lab
CZ
t ) ≡ At(capCZt−1)a(labCZt )1−a. (5)
Capital depreciates at a rate of δ % each period and labour is paid a competitive
wage wNt . At = eε
A
t A is the total factor productivity and εAt = ρAεAt−1 + uAt
is an autoregressive process with shock uAt . As there is a representative firm,
National Production or GDP, is defined as Yt = F (capCZt−1, labCZt ). Profits of
Czech firms are
ptpi
CZ
t ≡ptF (capCZt−1, labCZt ) + pt(1− δ)capCZt−1 − wNt labCZt −Rkt capCZt−1 (6)
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Firms maximise profits each period which results in factor prices being deter-
mined at their marginal product values
ptw
N
t = pt
∂F (capCZt−1, lab
CZ
t )
∂labCZt
, (7)
ptR
k
t = pt
∂F (capCZt−1, lab
CZ
t )
∂capCZt−1
+ pt(1− δ). (8)
Czech households access the international debt market and issue unsecured
(bCZu ) claims at competitive interest rate (Ru are the gross rates) in order
to finance consumption and investment decisions. Crucially, they decide how
much of their debt obligation to repay.
If they do not honour their unsecured debt completely, they incur a non-
pecuniary punishment, or utility cost, proportional to the amount they de-
fault upon, which reflects the costs involved in renegotiating the outstanding
amount. Furthermore, lenders are able to seize a fraction (κ) of the outstand-
ing debt from the new capital stock. We will conduct our normative policy
analysis on four different descriptions of the path of the recovery rate, κ.
There is a liquidity requirement for Czech households which specifies that
purchases of consumption and capital goods must be financed by domestic
currency. In addition, net trades in the bond market (repayment of existing
debt less new debt borrowed) must also be backed by cash. Cash is obtained
from borrowing from the domestic money market (intraperiod loan market) at
nominal interest rate i. All debt is indexed and so net trades are unaffected
by domestic price level fluctuations.
The budget constraint of the Czech household requires the allocation of in-
come from profits and labour plus new borrowings to consumption, investment,
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and repayment of existing debt. The cash-in-advance requirement results in
several effective transaction moments. Households first obtain money from the
money market, promising to repay bCZt at the end of the period. At the same
time, households receive a nominal, but indexed, transfer from the domestic
monetary-fiscal authority of ptτt.11
mCZt =
bCZt
1 + it
+ ptτt (9)
mCZt ≥ 0 (10)
ptc
CZ
t + ptcap
CZ
t + (1− defCZt )(Rut−1)ptbCZu,t−1
=ptb
CZ
u,t − κtdefCZt (Rut−1)ptbCZu,t−1 +mCZt (11)
bCZt = ptpi
CZ
t + ptR
k
t cap
CZ
t−1 + ptw
N
t lab
CZ
t (12)
The budget constraints can be combined, and the price level factored out,
to obtain
cCZt + cap
CZ
t + (1− defCZt )(Rut−1)bCZu,t−1
=bCZu,t − κtdefCZt (Rut−1)bCZu,t−1 +
piCZt +R
k
t cap
CZ
t−1 + w
N
t lab
CZ
t
1 + it
+ τt (13)
where cCZ is consumption, unsecured and secured debt issued is bCZu and
bCZs respectively, at a gross interest rate of (Ru) and (Rs) respectively, and the
11This is a Ricardian Fiscal policy and leaves the price level each period indeterminate.
Importantly however, fluctuations in inflation have no wealth effects and the non-neutrality
of monetary policy is derived solely from the cost of liquidity that money provides.
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proportion of unsecured outstanding debt repaid is (1−defCZ). κtdefCZt (Rut−1)bCZu,t−1
is the amount lenders seize from the new capital stock, and adj
CZ
u
2
(bCZu,t − b
CZ
u )
2
is the cost of adjusting unsecured debt away from steady state levels and can
be interpreted as the cost of renegotiating a different level of unsecured debt.
We allow the capital stock to be substitutable with income, and as a conse-
quence there is no non-negativity constraint on re-investment. The preferences
include a CRRA utility function for consumption and disutilities from supply-
ing labour and from renegotiating defaulted upon debt. The decision variables
are c, lab, bs, bu, def, cap.
UCZt =
[
(cCZt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
η
2
(labCZt )
2 − 1
2
{
defCZt (R
u
t−1)b
CZ
u,t−1
}2
ΩCZt
]
. (14)
and permits the usual recursive representation. The recursive representation
of preferences is
WCZt = U
CZ
t +
∞∑
s=1
βsEtWCZt+s . (15)
The renegotiation cost enforced on firms that choose to default on defGRCt %
of their unsecured debt is
1
2
{
ζ + defCZt+s(R
u
t+s−1)b
CZ
u,t+s−1
}2
ΩCZt+s, (16)
where ΩCZt is a pro-cyclical macro-variable which governs the severity of the
punishment enforced and ζ → 0 is an infinitesimally small positive number12.
12This parameter allows two steady-state equilibria to be supported; one where there is
no default and one where default occurs in equilibrium. For the remainder of this section
we consider the limit of ζ = 0
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ΩCZt is given by
ΩCZt ≡φCZ
{
(1− κ)ψCZ(1− defCZ)(defCZ)γ−1
CAP
CZ
}
CAPCZt−1
BCZu,t−1(1 + r
u
t−1)(def
CZ
t )
γ .
(17)
ΩCZt is the shadow cost of renegotiation, or the stochastic discount factor for
the cost of renegotiating debt in arrears. ψCZ is the steady state shadow value
of consumption for the Czech household. φCZ is what we call the default wedge
and determines the steady state rate of default. The aggregate default rate
also appears in the denominator as it allows us to consider the marginal effect
of the decision of an individual firm on the aggregate cost of default to the
whole economy. The inverse of the leverage ratio in the previous period also
enters as the ratio of the aggregate capital stock to the aggregate debt due.
As a consequence, ΩCZt turns out to be procyclical, i.e. with a high cost (high
value) in good times and a low cost (low value) in depressions. To see this,
note that when the capital stock is growing, the leverage ratio is high, with
the capital to debt ratio becoming low, and the shadow cost of default to the
borrower ΩCZt is low. When the shadow cost of default is low, the firms default
rate is likely to be higher (all else being equal).13
ΩCZt dynamically governs the cost of default. In Dubey et al. (2005) this
is a constant, but the marginal cost of default is only proportional to this and
hence constant. Here, even if ΩCZt was constant, the marginal cost of default,
13In richer models, where there are heterogenous productive sectors, default in one sector
will cause default in others: the chain reaction of default can exacerbate the financial dif-
ficulties of a relatively small sector of the economy into an economy-wide contagion. Our
macroeconomic variable, Ω captures this notion that industries are linked and default is
amplified as it spreads. An analogy is that if one room of a house floods, the entire house is
likely to be flooded.
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here renegotiation, is proportional to the quantity in arrears. This alone would
allow us to obtain a stationary solution. In contrast, Walsh (2015a) and Walsh
(2015b) have ΩCZt as a function of household wealth. As this is dynamic, so is
ΩCZt . However, there, this is necessary in order to obtain a stationary solution
as the marginal cost of default is still linear in ΩCZt . This is not so in our case.
We obtain stationarity by having the marginal cost proportional to the quan-
tity of default, however this alone would mean that the propensity to default
decreases as the quantity of debt outstanding increases. The specification we
have chosen for ΩCZt negates this, as it falls when default rates and the stock
of debt grows, hence increasing the propensity to default when the stock of
debt grows, addressing the empirical findings in the literature14.
The optimisation yields the following first order conditions, with ψCZt de-
fined as the shadow value of income:
ηlabCZt = ψ
CZ
t
wt
1 + it
(18)
ψCZt = Etβ
{
ψCZt+1
Rkt+1
1 + it+1
}
(19)
ψCZt
Rut
=
Etβ
{
(1− (1− κt+1)defCZt+1)ψCZt+1 + (defCZt+1)2(Rut )bCZu,t ΩCZt+1
}
(20)
ψCZt b
CZ
u,t−1(R
u
t−1)
= defCZt (R
u
t−1)
2(bCZu,t−1)
2ΩCZt + κt(R
u
t−1)b
CZ
u,t−1ψ
CZ
t (21)
Equation 18 is the FOC wrt to labour supplied while 19 is the FOC wrt capital
and states that the shadow value of capital equals the marginal effect of capital
14As in Benjamin and Wright (2013)
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on profits plus the increase in future capital stock. 20 is the FOC with respect
to unsecured debt and states that the marginal benefit of debt in increasing the
shadow value of capital is equated to the marginal cost of reducing profits by
the repayment rate and the renegotiation cost of increasing the quantity of debt
subject to default. Equation 21 is the FOC with respect to the repayment rate
on loans and equalises the marginal cost on profits of repaying an additional
percent of debt to the marginal benefit of reducing the renegotiation cost of
defaulting.
Equations 20 and 21 can be combined to give
ψCZt = R
u
t Etβ
{
ψCZt+1
}
(22)
Etβ
{
ψCZt+1
Rkt+1
1 + it+1
)
}
= (23)
3 Monetary Fiscal Authority
The counterfactual Czech monetary fiscal authority sets a period-by-period
short-term interest rate it, exchanges money for bonds and runs a period-by-
period non-Ricardian seingiorage policy (fiscal policy). Formally, they select a
priori the nominal value of seingiorage transferred to households each period
at Tt = τt. The flow budget constraints are
MCZt =
Bt
1 + it
+ ptTt (24)
Bt = M
CZ
t . (25)
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As a consequence
MCZt
it
1 + it
= ptTt. (26)
4 Market Clearing
Y CZt = c
CZ
t + cap
CZ
t + (1− defCZt )(Rut−1)bCZu,t−1 + κtdefCZt (Rut−1)bCZu,t−1 − bCZu,t
(27)
bCZu,t = b
GER
u,t (28)
5 Monetary Policy Rule
In our simulations, we consider nominal Czech interest rate governed by Taylor
rule, where the Monetary Authority pays attention to interest rate and output
gap:
1 + it
1 + iss
=
(
1 + it−1
1 + iss
)rI ( yt
yss
)rY
. (29)
In our analysis we contrast this policy rule with a static regime where
it = i. Moreover, in order to compare quantitive aspects, we consider two
different regimes of Taylor rule: low sensitive to output gap and high sensitive
one.
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6 Calibration
Our calibration follows closely that of Goodhart et al. (2016). The unsecured
rate 1.17% annum, which implies about 0.30% per quarter. This compares
with the average Czech 10 year bond yield from January 2013 to December
2017.15 The recovery rate on Czech debt securities was taken from Altman
et al. (1999) who estimated that the recovery rate on securities with AA rating
is 0.60 (Average Price) and 0.76 (Weighted Average Price) - we have taken the
weighted average point of 0.76. The default rates was defined as the share of
non-performing loans from total loans and was taken from the Czech National
Bank, which gave the mean and standard deviation as 5.52% and 0.74% annum,
respectively. Since we consider a quarterly simulation, the mean and standard
deviation default rates is 1.3% and 0.7364% per quarter in the acyclical case
while for unsecured debt repayment rates, the mean and standard deviations
in our economy are 99.7% and 0.1767% per quarter in the acyclical regime,
given the repayment rate includes a recovery rate of 76%. The present value
of the debt forgiven is around 17.5%, using the model unsecured interest rate.
These were set by choosing the default wedge, φ, to be 1/.987 and the default
accelerator, γ, to be .93 to obtain higher volatility in default decisions and
obtain counter-cyclical effects of default. The standard deviation of the shock
(uA) is 1%, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is 2, following Aliyev
et al. (2014) . In the same paper, the private depreciation rate of capital was
1.00% per quater. It implies around 4% annum. Aliyev et al. (2014) have a
labour share of income of .50, so we choose a to be .50. The labour supply is
15Taken from St Louis FRED database “Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year:
Main (Including Benchmark)”.
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set to .3544.
The Europeans in our numerical excise are defined as countries with the
largest cumulative FDI inflows into Czech Republic in 1993-2014. They are
Netherlands (23.9%), Austria (13.2%), Germany (12.6%) and France (6.1%).16
World Bank figures for the Net Foreign Asset (NFA) positions of Netherlands,
Austria, Germany, and France and Czech unsecured liabilities (liabilities to
Non-residents) give a ratio of Ex-Czech European NFA-to-Liabilities to Non-
residents almost 106 in 2013 and 32 in 2017, which we use to obtain the
ex-Czech NFA for Europeans of 40 times .
Table 1 lists values and sources.
Parameter Description Model Value Source Value Reference
uA Standard Deviation of TFP Shock 1% 1.44% Herber and Nemec (2009)
ρA Persistence of TFP shock 0.81 0.81 Aliyev et al. (2014)
σ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2 2 Aliyev et al. (2014)
δ Depreciation rate 1% 1% Aliyev et al. (2014)
a Share of Capital Income in Czech Republic 0.5 0.5 Aliyev et al. (2014)
lab Steady-state labour supply .353 .353
bu/Y
CZ Liabilities to Non-residents-to-GDP 100% 95% Czech National Bank, average for 2013-2017
NFA/bu Ex-Czech European NFA-to-Liabilities to Non-residents 40 32 to 106 (2013 and 2017) World Bank
E(Rut − 1) Mean Annual Unsecured interest rate .51 % 0.30% St.Louis/FRED
E(def) Mean default rates 1.30% 5.56% (annum) Czech National Bank
StD(def) StDev of default rates 0.7364% 0.74% (annum) Czech National Bank
κ Recovery rate on unsecured debt 0.76 0.76 Altman et al. (1999)
Table 1: List of Calibrated Values
Table 2 below shows the parameterisation of the economy.
7 Business Cycle Properties
In this section17 we simulate the 2nd order approximate version of the economy
and study the business cycle properties of our economy. We then examine the
impulse responses of our policy regimes.
16source: czechinvest “Investment Climate in the Czech Republic” 2017 report and CNB.
17Numerical calculations were performed in Dynare. We consider deviations from the
level.
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Parameter Description
βEU European rate of time preference, quarterly 0.998
βCZ Czech rate of time preference, quarterly 0.995
φCZ default wedge 0.987
γ default accelerator 0.93
At total factor productivity 1.005
η household preference for labour 1.8056
rI sensitivity to interest rate 0.3
rY sensitivity to output gap, low (high) 0.15(0.40)
Table 2: List of Parameters
7.1 Simulated Economy
Table 3 shows the moments of key variables in our economy. The mean values
change little across the policy regimes. However the standard deviation of all
the variables is changed with the Taylor rule under consideration. That the
standard deviation of unsecured rates rise is simply because of the additional
volatility induced by nominal interest rates on the real interest rate.
All variables become less correlated with Czech production, apart from Eu-
ropean consumption. This is because their income depends on the correlation
of the repayment rate with Czech output, which falls.
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Mean Standard Deviation
Acyc Monetary
with low
sensitivity
Monetary
with high
sensitivity
Acyc Monetary
with low
sensitivity
Monetary
with high
sensitivity
Ru − 1 0.005133 0.005136 0.005152 0.000987 0.002077 0.005019
REP 0.996469 0.996831 0.996391 0.001767 0.000667 0.001982
Rk − 1 0.055391 0.055400 0.055381 0.001336 0.001543 0.002081
capCZ 20.868255 20.871841 20.887235 0.446250 0.199295 0.525724
wageCZ 3.863871 3.863113 3.865176 0.078799 0.047342 0.049944
labCZ 0.353103 0.353267 0.353066 0.003038 0.002499 0.003395
Y CZ 2.729003 2.729610 2.729279 0.073283 0.050319 0.040854
cEU 3.279128 3.280131 3.279005 0.005004 0.005525 0.012625
cCZ 2.402310 2.401582 2.403021 0.019340 0.007491 0.021077
bu 2.724825 2.728486 2.724160 0.016205 0.015176 0.030778
Correlation with
Production
First Order
Auto-correlation
Acyc Monetary
with low
sensitivity
Monetary
with high
sensitivity
Acyc Monetary
with low
sensitivity
Monetary
with high
sensitivity
Ru − 1 0.4955 -0.9754 -0.9554 0.7934 0.7735 0.6466
REP 0.6732 -0.1042 -0.1727 0.9940 0.9532 0.9614
Rk − 1 0.6212 0.9256 0.6333 0.7800 0.8687 0.9326
capCZ 0.7397 -0.4983 -0.4244 0.9940 0.9858 0.9718
wageCZ 0.9703 0.9735 0.7712 0.9345 0.7446 0.6845
labCZ 0.8195 0.9183 0.5198 0.7871 0.8621 0.9548
Y CZ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8842 0.7725 0.6539
cEU 0.6037 -0.3077 -0.1355 0.9493 0.8705 0.8049
cCZ 0.7913 0.2954 -0.1383 0.9902 0.8493 0.9571
bu 0.7852 -0.6906 -0.5769 0.9862 0.9609 0.9302
Table 3: Business Cycle Properties of Simulated Economy
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7.2 Welfare Analysis
Our conditional welfare analysis shows that welfare improves for both Euro-
pean and Czech households when the monetary fiscal authority employs the
active monetary policy regime. Below we report the percentage deviation from
steady state values following a negative TFP shock under the acyclical mone-
tary policy regime and the active ones with low and high sensitivity to output
gap. The higher value corresponds to a higher value of undertaking the policy
action. Both active policies improve welfare of Europeans and Czechs, while
the active monetary policy with higher sensitivity to the output gap has the
highest welfare properties due to its better smoothing of the business cycle.
Acyc Monetary
with low
sensitivity
Monetary
with high
sensitivity
E0(W
CZ) -0.0231 0.0116 0.0264
E0(W
EU) -0.76e-3 0.41e-3 0.59e-3
Table 4: Welfare Properties of Simulated Economy
7.3 Impulse Responses
Goodhart et al. (2016) has showed that the possibility of debt forgiveness can
help to manage business cycles. As shown there, more "lenient" debt for-
giveness by creditor can decrease the business cycle fluctuations for lenders
as well as for borrowers. The role of this subsection is to demonstrate how
independent monetary policy can decrease fluctuations of key variables. Fig-
ures 1 to 3 give the impulse responses following a negative TFP shock under
passive (black line) and active monetary policy regimes (red starred and blue
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dashed lines). When it occurs, the reduction in income (before an adjustment
in labour supply) increases the marginal cost of honouring debt and default
rates rise for all regimes. As default rates rise the credit conditions variable
worsens and through the default accelerator we see an immediate large increase
in default rates. There is also a contraction in investment (seen in lower cap-
ital stock, debt and higher European consumption or less European saving),
which through the worsening expected credit conditions and default acceler-
ator, raises future default rates. The higher default premium then raises the
cost of debt, and the required return on capital, causing a further cycle of cap-
ital stock contraction. The immediate reduction in income from lower TFP
reduces wages, increasing labour supply and ultimately offsetting lower TFP
to increase output. The higher cost of issuing debt results in a deleveraging in
the Czech economy and investment is increasingly financed through domestic
savings resulting in a decline in Czech consumption.
Both active monetary policies are qualitatively the same, but have differ-
ent quantitive results. While negative TFP shock causes an increase in default
rates, a future active stimulating policy decreases expectations of future de-
faults. Active monetary policy stimulates investment through higher volumes
of unsecured loans, which with higher repayment rates increases consumption
of Europeans. Consumption of Czechs increases as a result of decrease in
liquidity costs which encourages trade.
The cyclical monetary policy regime (red starred series) has much larger
fluctuations than the static monetary policy driven by the larger immediate de-
cline in Czech consumption as a result of higher investment in capital. The re-
payment rate is slightly lower under the active policy regime, but rises rapidly.
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This translates into a faster adjustment in the capital stock to the steady state,
as well as wages and consumption. By comparing active monetary policy with
lower sensitivity with others, it is clear to see that an appropriate monetary
regime can help faster converge to steady state by minimising business cycle
fluctuations.
8 Concluding Remarks
Debt forgiveness for Greece which we studied in Goodhart et al. (2018) was
predicated on the possibility of fostering mutual dependence based on existing
political ties within the monetary union. For countries outside the union, such
possibilities are remote and domestic policies need to be invoked to manage
the build-up of systemic risks.
In this paper we focused on monetary policy, and specifically the liquidity
role of monetary policy. Higher interest rates increase the liquidity cost of
transactions, reducing trade while lower interest rates increase the efficiency,
and, consequently, the quantity of trade. In this manner, and abstracting
from important considerations of inflation, monetary policy may stabilise the
business cycle and enhance financial stability.
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Figure 1: Average stochastic path following negative TFP shock under different policy regimes. Welfare is the
conditional welfare series.
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Figure 2: Average stochastic path following negative TFP shock under different policy regimes.
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Figure 3: Average stochastic path following negative TFP shock under different policy regimes.
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